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Abstract. Isotopic reference materials certified for the age of nuclear material (uranium, plutonium) 
are needed in the fields of nuclear forensics and environmental measurements. Therefore a feasibility 
study for the development of plutonium reference materials for age dating has been started recently 
at the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (EC-JRC-IRMM). The "age" of the 
material is defined as the time that has passed since the last chemical separation of the mother and 
daughter isotopes (e.g. 
241
Pu and 
241
Am). Assuming that the separation has been complete and all the 
daughter isotopes have been removed from the original material during this last separation, the age of 
the material can be determined by measuring the ratio of daughter and mother radio-nuclides, e.g. 
241
Am/
241
Pu. At a given time after the last separation and depending on the half lives of the radio-
nuclides involved, a certain amount of the daughter radionuclide(s) will be present. For the 
determination of the unknown age of a material different "clocks" can be used; "clocks" are pairs of 
mother and daughter radio-nuclides, such as 
241
Am/
241
Pu, 
238
Pu/
234
U, 
239
Pu/
235
U, 
240
Pu/
236
U, and 
possibly 
242
Pu/
238
U. For the age estimation of a real sample, such as material seized in nuclear 
forensics investigations or dust samples in environmental measurements, it is advisable to use more 
than one clock in order to ensure the reliability of the results and to exclude the possibility that the 
sample under question is a mixture of two or more materials. Consequently, a future reference 
material certified for separation date should ideally be certified for more than one "clock" or several 
reference materials for different "clocks" should be developed. The first step of this study is to verify 
the known separation dates of different plutonium materials of different ages and isotopic 
compositions by measuring the mother (
238
Pu, 
239
Pu, 
240
Pu, 
241
Pu, 
242
Pu) and daughter (
234
U, 
235
U, 
236
U, 
238
U and 
241
Am) isotope abundances and to estimate the achievable uncertainties of the 
calculated ages. Thermal ionisation mass spectrometry (TIMS) is applied for the measurement of the 
plutonium and uranium isotope ratios after chemical separation of the plutonium and uranium 
fractions from the sample matrix, while 
241
Am is measured by gamma-ray spectrometry. In the 
course of this work the reference materials NBS SRM 946, 947 and 948 (NBL CRM 136, 137 and 
138) will be investigated among others. 
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1 Introduction 
In these times of a "nuclear renaissance" on the one side and of concerns on nuclear proliferation 
and nuclear terrorism on the other hand, aspects of non-proliferation and nuclear security need to be 
given increased attention. This entails addressing also the associated technical challenges and 
developing sound solutions which enable and support defendable conclusions [1]. These concerns 
were concisely summarised by the words of the president of the United States of America, Barack 
Obama, on April 7, 2009 in Prague, addressing the topics of nuclear security and post-cold-war 
weapons: “In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk 
of a nuclear attack has gone up.” [2] 
Therefore not only the nuclear safeguards system needs to be strengthened and kept up to date for 
present and future challenges, but nuclear forensics also needs to be ready to provide substantiated 
answers in a timely manner in case of need. The first cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material 
occurred in the early 1990s, and since then more than one hundred cases of illicit trafficking of 
nuclear material have been reported. [3] Whenever nuclear material (uranium, plutonium) is 
discovered being out of regulatory control, nuclear forensic investigations may be applied in 
addition to traditional forensics. While traditional forensics recover and analyse evidence such as 
fingerprints, genetic markers along with other traces like fibres and residues left behind by the 
malefactor in order to identify the individual who committed the crime, nuclear forensics focuses on 
providing hints on the origin and the history of the seized material. Nuclear forensics uses rather the 
exclusion principle than directly pointing to one conclusion: databases containing facility specific 
attributes of nuclear material aid in narrowing down possible origins of the material in question. In 
order to find the latest legal owner of the nuclear material the isotopic and elemental composition 
(major elements and impurities) in combination with its physical appearance (dimensions of larger 
objects; particle form and size of powders) are determined. These three parameters assist in 
determining the production process and/or reactor type the material was intended for. Additionally 
the "age", i.e. the time since the last separation, of the material can be determined. This information 
is of crucial importance for the investigators, since it helps in reducing the number of facilities 
where the material has possibly been separated considerably due to the fact that all facilities built 
after the separation date can be ruled out.[4] Knowledge of the date of the last separation of the 
material also enables the exact initial composition of the material to be calculated. [5]  
2 Reference materials for nuclear age dating – status quo 
As the Guide to Quality in Analytical Chemistry states, “the value of chemical measurements 
depends upon the level of confidence that can be placed in the results”.[6] In order to ensure a high 
level of confidence in measurement results in general, quality control and quality assurance systems 
need to be established. Comparability of results obtained by different laboratories and methods is 
achieved by comparison to known reference values. Consequently, confidence in measurements is 
ensured by the verification of measurement results and the establishment of traceability through the 
use of certified reference materials. Certified reference materials are also required for the validation 
of measurement procedures and calibration of instruments. Analysts need to prove that their 
measurement procedures are "fit for purpose", i.e. the measurement performance meets the 
requirements of the analysis. Although the need to establish the above mentioned goals in order to 
produce and publish sound analytical results is crucial as such, it is not always straight forward. In 
addition to that, confidence in the integrity and quality of measurement results and services is of 
great importance, resulting in more and more laboratories striving for accreditation, e.g. ISO/IEC 
17025. [7] 
Certified reference materials are defined by ISO Guide 30 as sufficiently homogeneous and stable 
materials with respect to one or more specified properties. These materials are characterized to be fit 
for the intended use by a metrologically valid procedure and are accompanied by a certificate that 
provides the value of the specified property, its associated uncertainty and a statement of 
metrological traceability.[8] Realistically speaking, it is not always possible to use a certified 
reference material because of the unavailability of materials certified for the properties under 
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investigation, such as the "age" of a nuclear material. In these cases, it is recommended that "a 
material with suitable properties and stability should be selected […] and used as a laboratory 
measurement standard".[6] It should be noted, however, that the "age" of the material is not a 
directly measurable quantity. Ratios of the numbers of atoms of the mother nuclide and of the 
related daughter nuclide are measured. The measurements can be carried out by gamma ray 
spectrometry or preferably by isotope dilution mass spectrometry. Based on these measurements, the 
age of the material is calculated. In consequence, the actual measurement requires spike reference 
materials for quantification of the amount of mother and daughter nuclide as well as isotopic 
reference materials for calibration of the measurement apparatus (e.g. instrumentation). The 
motivation for developing age dating reference materials is largely based on the need for validating 
analytical procedures and for applying quality control (to demonstrate that the procedure is well 
under control). Providing confidence in measurement results by demonstrating that the whole 
analytical process is well under control is of major importance in nuclear forensics which is a top 
priority on the political agenda [9]. Presently, no reference materials certified for their "age" are 
available. In their absence, researchers have been using materials with well known and well 
documented separation date as replacement. Thus, scientists have to rely on various sources for 
"reference ages", for method development and quality control. The sources of information for the 
given "reference age" (of materials used so far for method development) in literature are fairly 
inhomogeneous. Yet authors indicate on what grounds they assumed a certain "reference age" such 
as dates on certificates, old documentation and interlaboratory comparisons [5, 10-15]. Most of 
those assumed reference dates might be well justified but, the lack of nuclear reference materials 
actually certified for the separation date leads to situations where different reference ages 
(separation dates) for the same material can be found in different publications such as for the 
material SRM 947 in [5] and [13]. Another problem caused by the lack of nuclear reference 
materials certified for the separation date is the absence of proof of complete separation possibly 
leading to ambiguous results even when applying sophisticated measurement techniques. In 
consequence, the availability of nuclear reference materials properly certified for their "age" would 
provide a more solid metrological basis for age dating measurements and would thus increase the 
value of the conclusions based on these measurements. It is therefore not surprising that the need for 
nuclear reference materials certified for age has been repeatedly expressed by members of the 
nuclear safeguards and nuclear forensics community. Because of this feasibility a study for the 
development of plutonium reference materials for age dating has recently been started at the 
Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (EC-JRC-IRMM) in cooperation with the 
Institute for Transuranium Elements (EC-JRC-ITU) in order to meet the present needs of 
laboratories involved in nuclear forensics analysis. 
3 Age dating of plutonium 
Unstable isotopes decay following distinct decay schemes until a stable isotope is formed, such as 
illustrated in Figure 1 for the decay of 
241
Pu. The principle of measuring declining amounts of the 
originating so called mother isotope relative to the amounts of the formed daughter isotopes has 
been used for the age determination of minerals and rocks by geologists for many years. The 
chemical composition of rock mass changes with time, thus the age can be derived from measuring 
the ratio of mother to daughter isotope. Isotope pairs such as 
226
Ra/
238
U, 
230
Th/
234
U and 
231
Pa/
235
U are 
deployed as chronometers in geology providing "absolute" methods for the determination of the 
time that has passed since the formation of the rock [16] whereby the assumption has to be made 
that during the rock formation parent and daughter isotopes were completely separated during the 
process. Similarily, the "age" of nuclear material is defined as the time that has passed since the last 
chemical or physical separation of the mother and daughter isotopes, e.g. 
241
Pu and 
241
Am (Figure 
1).  
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Figure 1. Decay scheme of 
241
Pu [17] 
 
Assuming that the separation has been complete and all the daughter isotopes have been removed 
completely from the original material, the age of the material can be determined by measuring the 
ratio of mother and daughter radionuclides, e.g. 
241
Pu/
241
Am. At a given time after the separation and 
depending on the half-lives of the radionuclides involved, a certain amount of the daughter radio-
nuclide has built up. For the determination of the age of nuclear material, different chronometers or 
"clocks" can be used. These "clocks" are distinct pairs of mother and daughter radio-nuclides. The 
isotope pairs formed by plutonium mother isotopes and their respective daughter isotopes plus their 
half-lives are given in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Isotope pairs formed by plutonium mother isotopes and their respective daughter isotopes
Clock Half-life mother  Reference Half-life  daughter Reference 
236
Pu/
232
U 2.87(1) a [18]  70(1) a [18] 
238
Pu/
234
U 87.74(3) a [18] 2.455(6)·10
5
 a [18] 
239
Pu/
235
U 2.410(3)·10
4
 a [18] 7.04(1)·10
8
 a [18] 
240
Pu/
236
U 6561(7) a [18] 2.342(4)·10
7
 a [18] 
241
Pu/
241
Am 14.325(24) a [19] 432.6(6) a [18] 
242
Pu/
238
U 3.73(3)·10
5
 a [18] 4.468(5)·10
9
 a [18] 
244
Pu/
240
Pu 80.0(9)·10
6
 a [18] 6561(7) a [18] 
 
Separation of mother and daughter isotopes 
↓ 
only mother isotopes left = “clock” set to zero 
↓ 
newly build up of daughter isotopes with time 
↓ 
measure ratio of mother/daughter isotope 
(“clock”) 
↓ 
“age” calculation 
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241
Pu/
241
Am, 
238
Pu/
234
U, 
239
Pu/
235
U, 
240
Pu/
236
U are considered useful for age dating of plutonium 
materials [20]. Equations 1 to 5 illustrate an age calculation using the isotope pair 
241
Pu/
241
Am. 
241
Put 
is the amount of 
241
Pu at the present time t (i.e. time of the measurement) while 
241
Pu0 is the amount 
of 
241
Pu at the time of the separation. The decay constant  can be calculated from the half-life t1/2 
according to equation 2. 
241
Amt is the amount of 
241
Am at the present time t; R241Pu/241Am is the 
measured ratio 
241
Pu/
241
Am at the present time t. 
 
241
Put = 
241
Pu0 * e
-*t
      [1] 
 
 = t1/2
-1
 * ln 2      [2] 
 
241
Amt = 
241
Pu0 - 
241
Put = 
241
Pu0 *(1 - e
-*t
)  [3] 
 
R241Pu/241Am = 
241
Put / 
241
Amt = e
-*t
 * (1 - e
-*t
)
-1
  [4] 
 
t = -1 * ln [(R241Pu/241Am + 1)* R241Pu/241Am 
-1
]  [5] 
 
For the age estimation of a real sample, such as material seized in nuclear forensics investigations or 
a dust sample in environmental measurements, it is advisable to use more than one clock in order to 
ensure the reliability of the results. Otherwise wrong conclusions could be reached: Non matching 
chronometers can be a result of incomplete separation i.e. not all clocks have been set to "zero" 
during the separation [10]. Non matching clocks can also result from a sample that is a mixture of 
two or more different materials. Consequently, a future reference material certified for separation 
date should ideally be certified for more than one "clock" or several reference materials for different 
"clocks" need to be developed. 
4 Experimental Setup 
There are basically three possible strategies to produce isotopic reference materials certified for the 
age of nuclear material [21]: 
 
 Characterization of an existing (old) material with well-known separation date 
 
 Quantitative separation (set clock to time "zero") of bulk material leading to a material with 
documented separation date and completeness of separation  
 
 Mixture of purified fractions of mother and daughter isotopes to mimic a certain “age” 
 
This study deals with the first two of those strategies primarily focusing at the characterisation of a 
known material in the first place. Thus, the first step of this study is to verify the known separation 
dates of different plutonium materials differing in age and enrichment. Mother (
238
Pu, 
239
Pu, 
240
Pu, 
241
Pu, 
242
Pu) and daughter (
234
U, 
235
U, 
236
U, 
238
U and 
241
Am) isotope abundances are determined in 
order to calculate not only the age using different clocks but also to estimate the uncertainties of the 
calculated ages ideally combining the results of several isotope pairs. The experimental setup for the 
measurements is shown in Figure 2. Thermal ionisation mass spectrometry (TIMS) is applied for the 
measurement of the plutonium and uranium isotope ratios. After chemical separation of the 
plutonium and uranium fractions from the sample matrix, isotope abundance measurements as well 
as isotope dilution mass spectrometric measurements (IDMS) are performed. 
241
Am is measured by 
gamma-ray spectrometry. 
 
 
 
6 
U isotope abundance 
U concentration via IDMS 
 
 
Figure 2. Scheme of analysis for nuclear age dating of Pu materials 
5 Selected starting materials 
The selected candidate starting materials for reference materials for nuclear age dating are shown in 
Table 2. The applied classification into grades is explained in Table 3. In the course of this work the 
well known reference materials certified for isotopic abundance NBS SRM 946, 947 and 948 (NBL 
CRM 136, 137 and 138) will be investigated among others. Certification for the age of widely 
↓ 
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with anion exchange resin 
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Separation 
with anion exchange resin 
 
Pu/U 
U 
Pu isotope abundance 
TIMS measurement 
 
↓ 
↓ ↓ 
↓ 
Pu 
↓ 
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↓ 
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Pu/
241
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↓ 
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Separation 
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Am 
Separation 
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Pu/U 
U 
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Addition of 
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Pu spike (IRMM-049c) 
↓ 
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↓ 
Pu 
↓ 
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↓ 
Sample 
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Am 
Separation 
with anion exchange resin 
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Addition of 
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↓ 
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distributed materials like the above mentioned provides a powerful tool to scientists to improve the 
quality of age dating of nuclear material. 
 
Table 2. The candidate starting materials for reference materials for nuclear age dating 
  Isotopic composition of plutonium (%)  
Sample Material 
238
Pu 
239
Pu 
240
Pu 
241
Pu 
242
Pu grade 
ACH-104-1
2
 PuO2 0,85 73,32 18,3 5,46 2,08 fuel grade 
ACH-104-2
2
 PuO2 0,07 84,34 14,2 1,03 0,36 fuel grade 
ACH-104-3
2
 PuO2 1,2 62,3 25,4 6,7 4,2 reactor grade 
ACH-103
2
 PuO2 0,01 93,4 6,3 0,2 0,04 weapon grade 
NBS 946
3
 Pu(SO4)2.4H2O 0,19 86,07 12,51 0,64 0,58 fuel grade 
NBS 947
3
 Pu(SO4)2.4H2O 0,23 78,76 19,05 0,74 1,22 reactor grade 
NBS 948
3
 Pu(SO4)2.4H2O 0,01 91,93 7,95 0,08 0,03 fuel grade 
 
Table 3. Classification into grades of plutonium materials by the U.S. Department of Energy [22] 
Grades Pu-240 Content 
Weapon grade < 7 % 
Fuel grade 7-19 % 
Reactor grade > 19 % 
6 Conclusion 
Isotopic reference materials certified for the age of nuclear material are clearly needed in the fields 
of nuclear forensics, since information about the separation date is crucial for nuclear forensic 
investigators. Knowledge of the age of an unknown sample not only helps to reduce the number of 
facilities where the material has possibly been separated, but also enables the initial composition of 
the material to be calculated. Especially in a highly sensitive field like nuclear forensics where 
measurement results can potentially lead to far reaching consequences the reliability of the obtained 
age of an unknown sample must be assured by the use of reference materials certified for the 
property of “age”. These certified reference materials should combine the following properties: 
 
 Certification for the time elapsed since the last separation, i.e. removal of the daughter 
isotopes from the mother isotope. 
 
 The completeness of this separation must be guaranteed for the clock(s) the material is 
certified for. 
 
 Ideally, one single certified reference material should be certified for several clocks; 
alternatively, a set of certified reference materials complementing one another should be 
made available. 
 
 The value for the age of the certified reference material and its uncertainty should ideally 
combine uncertainties obtained from all the clocks under investigation 
 
A feasibility study for such a certified reference material for the age of plutonium material is 
currently conducted by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Reference 
Materials and Measurements, Geel, Belgium in cooperation with the Institute for Transuranium 
Elements, Karlsruhe, Germany.  
 
References  
 
1. IAEA. International Status and Prospects of Nuclear Power.  2009  [cited; Available from: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/NuclearPower/np08.pdf  
                                                     
2
 Material originating from BELGONUCLEAIRE, Dessel, Belgium 
3
 Material originating from National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., USA 
 
 
8 
2. Obama, B. Remarks by President Barack Obama; April 5, 2009; Hradcany Square, Prague, 
Czech Republic. Speeches & Remarks  2009  [cited 2010 11.08.2010]; Available from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-
As-Delivered/. 
3. Mayer, K., M. Wallenius, and T. Fanghänel, Nuclear forensic science--From cradle to maturity. 
Journal of Alloys and Compounds, 2007. 444-445: p. 50-56. 
4. Redermeier, A., Fingerprinting of Nuclear Material for Nuclear Forensics. ESARDA 
BULLETIN, 2009(43): p. 71-76. 
5. Wallenius, M., P. Peerani, and L. Koch, Origin Determination of Plutonium Material in Nuclear 
Forensics. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, 2000. 246(2): p. 317-321. 
6. CITAC and Eurachem, Guide to Quality in Analytical Chemistry - An Aid to Accreditation. 
CITAC/Eurachem Guide. 2002. 
7. ISO, ISO/IEC 17025:2005 General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration 
laboratories. 2005, Geneva: International Organization for Standardization. 
8. ISO, ISO Guide 30:1992/Amd 1:2008 – Terms and definitions used in connection with reference 
materials. 2008, Geneva: International Organization for Standardization. 
9. Ulicny, W., oral presentation: National Technical Nuclear Forensics: Overview, QA, and 
Expertise Development W. Ulicny, Editor. 2009, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Domestic Nuclear Dedection Office  
10. Wallenius, M. and K. Mayer, Age determination of plutonium material in nuclear forensics by 
thermal ionisation mass spectrometry. Fresenius' Journal of Analytical Chemistry, 2000. 366(3): 
p. 234-238. 
11. Wallenius, M., Origin determination of reator produed plutonium by mass spectrometrc 
techniques: application to nuclear forensic science and safeguards, in Faculty of Science, 
Department of Chemistry, Laboratory of Radiochemistry. 2001, University of Helsinki: Helsinki. 
p. 68. 
12. Nygren, U., H. Ramebäck, and C. Nilsson, Age determination of plutonium using inductively 
coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, 2007. 
272(1): p. 45-51. 
13. Shinonaga, T., et al., Age determination of single plutonium particles after chemical separation. 
Spectrochimica Acta Part B: Atomic Spectroscopy, 2009. 64(1): p. 95-98. 
14. Nguyen, C.T., Verification of the 239Pu content, isotopic composition and age of plutonium in 
Pu-Be neutron sources by gamma-spectrometry. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics 
Research Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms, 2006. 251(1): p. 227-236. 
15. Keegan, R.P. and R.J. Gehrke, A method to determine the time since last purification of weapons 
grade plutonium. Applied Radiation and Isotopes, 2003. 59(2-3): p. 137-143. 
16. Watchman, A.L. and C.R. Twidale, Relative and [`]absolute' dating of land surfaces. Earth-
Science Reviews, 2002. 58(1-2): p. 1-49. 
17. UWA. decay chain explorer.  2007  [cited 17.08.2010]; Available from: 
http://spice.duit.uwa.edu.au/samples/ast0197/. 
18. Be, M., V. Chiste, and C. Dulieu, Note Technique DETECS/LNHB/2006-58: Halve-lives, Table of 
recommended values. 2006: Laboratoire Natonal Henri Becquerel. 
19. Wellum, R., A. Verbruggen, and R. Kessel, A new evaluation of the half-life of 241Pu. Journal of 
Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, 2009. 24(6): p. 801-807. 
20. Mayer, K., M. Wallenius, and I. Ray, Nuclear forensics - A methodology providing clues on the 
origin of illicitly trafficked nuclear materials. Analyst, 2005. 130(4): p. 433-441. 
21. Bürger, S., et al. Radiochronometry of nuclear materials. in 49th INMM Annual Meeting. 2008. 
Nashville, Tennessee USA: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
22. DOE. Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade 
Plutonium.  2010 January 21, 2010 [cited 17.08.2010]; Available from: 
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms.jsp?formurl=document/press/pc29.html#ZZ3. 
 
 
